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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 The district court in this case predicted that, after 
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), we would 
require a plaintiff at summary judgment in a suit brought under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et 
seq., and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 
§ 10:5-1 et seq., to prove both that his employer's reasons for 
terminating him were false and that the real reason for 
termination was discrimination.  Recent decisions of this court, 
including Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994), Torre 
v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825 (3d Cir. 1994), and Sempier v. 
Johnson & Higgins, No. 94-5208 (3d Cir. Jan. 6, 1995), have 
established that this prediction was inaccurate.  Because the 
district court's legal standard was thus in error, the principal 
  
question for our review is whether under the proper standard, the 
defendant was entitled to summary judgment.  In other words, 
provided that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to 
establish a prima facie case, did he also provide sufficient 
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could determine that either 
his employer's reasons for terminating him were false or that 
discrimination was more than likely the motivating factor?  We 
find that the plaintiff, Reed Waldron, presented sufficient 
evidence to survive summary judgment, and therefore we will 
reverse. 
 I. 
 SL Waber, Inc., a subsidiary of SL Industries, Inc., 
manufactures machinery designed to protect sensitive electrical 
and electronic equipment.  Reed Waldron was employed at Waber 
from 1972 through 1986, but was laid off in 1986 because of a 
reorganization.  In 1989, after two years of work at a competitor 
of Waber, he was rehired by Waber as a consultant.  He was 61 
years old when he was rehired. 
 In July 1990, Waber found that the employee functioning 
as industrial market manager, Scott Hammill, was having 
difficulties.  Thus, Waber decided to split the industrial market 
manager position into two positions separately devoted to 
marketing electronic equipment and electrical equipment.  Hammill 
was given the electronic marketing manager's position, and 
Waldron was named electrical marketing manager.  In spring of 
1991, Hammill voluntarily left Waber, the positions were 
  
reconsolidated, and Waldron was given the reconsolidated position 
of industrial market manager. 
 There is conflicting evidence about whether Waldron 
performed his tasks adequately in the industrial market manager 
position.  Predictably, Waldron contended that he did a good job, 
but the company said that he did not vigorously pursue key 
accounts and performed poorly during a series of incidents 
related to preparation of and presentation to Waber's parent, SL 
Industries, of the fiscal year 1992 business plan. 
 In August 1991, just after the company adopted the 1992 
business plan, Waldron was discharged -- at the age of 63.  Kevin 
Woznicki, vice-president of sales and marketing, apparently told 
Waldron that his job had been eliminated, that his former duties 
were being distributed between two new positions -- electronics 
market manager and electrical market manager -- and that Waldron 
was "not the best candidate" for either position, principally 
because he did not go after key accounts.  Although Woznicki 
apparently told Waldron he was terminated (Joint Appendix 
("App.") 116), Woznicki first sought and received approval of the 
decision from Ronald Mazik, the company's president.  
 Shortly thereafter, Ed Brown, a telephone sales 
representative aged 32, was promoted to the electronics market 
manager's position -- that is, one half of Waldron's old job.  
The electrical market manager position (the other half) was never 
advertised or filled, and within a short time (five to six 
months) the company recombined the two positions with Brown in 
  
the consolidated post -- again called industrial market manager, 
the title of Waldron's old job. 
 Waldron sued Waber, claiming that he had been 
discharged because of his age in violation of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.,1 and 
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 et 
seq. ("LAD").2  The company moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that, under the "pretext-plus" standard that it predicted we 
would adopt for dealing with summary judgment after Hicks, 
                     
1
.   Section 623(a)(1) of Title 29 of the United States Code 
provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's age."  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). 
2
.   The LAD provides: 
 
   It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice, or, as the case may be, an unlawful 
discrimination: 
 
   a.  For an employer, because of the 
race, creed, color, national origin, 
ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or 
sexual orientation, sex or atypical 
hereditary cellular or blood trait of any 
individual, or because of the liability for 
service in the Armed Forces of the United 
States or the nationality of any individual, 
to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to 
discharge or require to retire, unless 
justified by lawful considerations other than 
age, from employment such individual or to 
discriminate against such individual in 
compensation or in terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment . . . . 
N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-12(a). 
  
Waldron did not have sufficient evidence upon which a jury could 
find both that Waber's reasons for firing him were pretextual and 
that the real reason for the termination was age-related animus.  
The district court agreed, found that the ADEA and LAD claims 
were governed by the same standard, and rendered summary judgment 
in favor of the company.  The district court had jurisdiction 
under 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 II. 
 A. 
 In St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 
(1993), the Supreme Court addressed a pervasive split that had 
developed among the courts of appeals over the proper application 
of the scheme established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792 (1973), for allocating the burdens of production and 
presentation of proof in cases involving allegations of 
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.  Under the familiar shifting burdens analysis of 
McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must initially establish a minimal 
prima facie case -- essentially, that he or she is a member of a 
protected class and was qualified for an employment position, but 
that he or she was either not hired for that position or was 
fired from it "under circumstances that give rise to an inference 
of unlawful discrimination."  Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).3  Once the plaintiff 
                     
3
.   As the Supreme Court made clear, the precise elements of a 
plaintiff's prima facie case may vary with the particular 
  
establishes his or her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to articulate one or more legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for its employment decision.  If one or 
more such reasons are proffered, the presumption of 
discrimination created by establishment of the prima facie case 
is dispelled, and the plaintiff must prove that the employer's 
proffered reason or reasons were pretextual -- that is, that they 
are false and that the real reason for the employment decision 
was discriminatory. 
 It was the meaning of this last phase of the McDonnell 
Douglas scheme that had caused dissention among the courts of 
appeals:  if a plaintiff proved that an employer's proffered 
reasons were unworthy of credence, must the jury return a verdict 
in his or her favor, or was it still required to find that 
discriminatory animus more than likely caused the employment 
decision?  In Hicks, resolving a circuit conflict, the Court 
decided that although "[t]he factfinder's disbelief of the 
reasons put forward by the defendant . . . may, together with the 
elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional 
discrimination," so that if an employer's proffered reasons for 
the employment decision are rejected, "no additional proof of 
(..continued) 
circumstances.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
802 n.14 (1973); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 
& n.15 (1977); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248, 253 n.5 (1981).  See generally Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 
F.3d 825, 830-31 (3d Cir. 1994) ("the nature of the required 
showing to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment by 
indirect evidence depends on the circumstances of the case" 
(internal quotation omitted)). 
  
discrimination is required," nevertheless the ultimate burden of 
persuasion remains on the plaintiff throughout the case.  Id. at 
2749.  Thus, "a plaintiff's proof of his or her prima facie case 
and proof that the employer's proffered reasons are false does 
not compel a judgment in the plaintiff's favor."  Id. 
 Although Hicks resolved the issue of whether a 
plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law at trial if 
he or she establishes a prima facie case and discredits an 
employer's justifications for the employment decision, it did not 
address the standard by which summary judgment should be assessed 
in a pretext case under the ADEA.4  The district court in this 
case noted that we had not yet ruled on this issue, but predicted 
that we would side with those courts of appeals that had required 
plaintiffs at summary judgment to produce evidence of "pretext-
plus."  Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 996, 1004 
n.11 (D. N.J. 1994).  That is, the district court predicted that 
at summary judgment we would require plaintiffs to demonstrate" 
both that the employer's reasons are false and that the real 
reasons were discriminatory . . . ."  Id.  
 Contrary to the district court's prediction, however, 
in Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994), we joined 
those of our sister circuits who have read Hicks to require at 
                     
4
.    Although Hicks was a Title VII case, its analysis applies 
to ADEA cases, as well.  See McKenna v. Pacific Rail Services, 
Inc., 32 F.3d 820, 825-26 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1994) (shifting burden 
analysis applicable to Title VII cases also applicable to cases 
under ADEA). 
  
summary judgment "pretext-only."  Judge Becker noted in Fuentes 
that, 
 [b]ecause the factfinder may infer from the 
combination of the plaintiff's prima facie 
case and its own rejection of the employer's 
proffered non-discriminatory reasons that the 
employer unlawfully discriminated against the 
plaintiff and was merely trying to conceal 
its illegal act with the articulated reasons, 
see Hicks, __ U.S. at __, 113 S. Ct. at 2749, 
a plaintiff who has made out a prima facie 
case may defeat a motion for summary judgment 
by either (i) discrediting the proffered 
reasons, either circumstantially or directly, 
or (ii) adducing evidence, whether 
circumstantial or direct, that discrimination 
was more likely than not a motivating or 
determinative cause of the adverse employment 
action. 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. 
 Thus, we clarified that "if the plaintiff has pointed 
to evidence sufficient[] to discredit the defendant's proffered 
reasons, to survive summary judgment the plaintiff need not also 
come forward with additional evidence of discrimination beyond 
his or her prima facie case."  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.  This 
standard is obviously different from that imposed by the district 
court, and it will be our responsibility on appeal to assess 
whether, under this standard, plaintiff's claims should have 
survived summary judgment.5 
                     
5
.   Although Waber conceded at oral argument that the district 
court applied the incorrect legal standard under Fuentes and its 
progeny, the company sought in its brief to undercut the strength 
of Fuentes' precedential value by contending that it is 
inconsistent with two of our other recent decisions:  Seman v. 
Coplay Cement Co., 26 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 1994), decided two months 
before Fuentes, and Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 759 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  Those decisions, however, are entirely consistent 
with Fuentes.  See Seman, 26 F.3d at 433 (noting that, under 
  
 B. 
 At summary judgment, the district court found that 
Waldron had established a prima facie case, and Waber does not 
contest that issue on appeal.  However, the district court 
credited Waber with having established the following non-
discriminatory business justification for its decision to 
terminate Waldron.  Because of economic hardship, Waber was 
forced to restructure its industrial marketing business, and one 
of the changes involved reverting to the organizational structure 
it had formerly used.  That is, Waber decided to re-bifurcate the 
two segments of the industrial market -- electrical and 
electronics -- with each segment having its own manager.  
However, Waber decided that Waldron was not the best candidate 
for either of the two positions.  Having had the chance to assess 
Waldron's performance as industrial market manager for more than 
a year, the company determined that he was not the best candidate 
for either new position primarily because Waldron had not 
sufficiently visited "key accounts."  The company's conclusion 
was confirmed when it was preparing its fiscal 1992 business 
plan.  Waldron's portion of the business plan was considered 
(..continued) 
Hicks, "rejection of the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory 
reason will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact 
of intentional discrimination, so long as there is a finding of 
discrimination.  In other words, `[t]he factfinder's disbelief of 
the reasons put forward by the [employer] . . . may, together 
with the elements of the [employee's] prima facie case, suffice 
to show intentional discrimination.'"); Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 
783 (recognizing that disbelief in the employer's proffered 
explanations, combined with the plaintiff's prima facie case, may 
be sufficient to allow a jury to infer the "ultimate fact of 
intentional discrimination"). 
  
inadequate and needed a "massive overhaul," and when called upon 
at a meeting to rehearse his part of the presentation, he was 
unprepared.  Furthermore, at the conclusion of the presentation 
to the management of Waber's parent, SL Industries, Waldron made 
comments about increasing sales by increasing sales reps' 
commissions that showed that he either did not know -- or did not 
agree with -- the direction Waber was pursuing, since Waber's 
plan was to increase sales by pursuing "key accounts" -- very 
large current or potential customers.  Waldron, 849 F. Supp. at 
1002. 
 In reply, Waldron contends that he established both 
that Waber's putative justifications were false and that age-
related bias in fact motivated the decision to fire him.  We 
evaluate Waldron's responses to Waber's explanation below.  As we 
do, we recall that since this case is before us for review of a 
grant of summary judgment, we address the case as if we were the 
district court, exercising plenary review of both facts and law.  
Additionally, we must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmovant, giving that party the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences derived from the evidence.  Torre v. Casio, 
42 F.3d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 1994).6 
                     
6
.   Waber argued to the district court that it should apply the 
Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796 (4th 
Cir. 1991), that because Waldron was 61 years old when hired by 
Waber and 63 1/2 years old when promoted prior to termination, a 
strong inference existed that discrimination was not a 
determining factor for the adverse action taken by the employer.  
Although the district court did not rely on Proud, it did "accept 
the logic that underlies the Proud inference."   Waldron, 849 
F. Supp. at 1006 n.14. 
 
  
 1. 
 Addressing first the company's reorganization plan, 
Waldron contends that the evidence at summary judgment would 
permit a jury to reasonably conclude that the reorganization was 
simply a way of getting rid of him in favor of a younger 
employee, Ed Brown (age 32).  Waldron does not dispute that the 
company was experiencing economic difficulties during the period 
leading up to his dismissal.  However, Waldron argues that the 
evidence of Waber's post-termination conduct belies the company's 
contention that a valid reorganization precipitated Waldron's 
termination. 
 Waldron begins by explaining that the evidence, viewed 
in his favor, shows that Waber split the industrial market 
manager position into two segments and named Brown to the post of 
electronics marketing manager, but it left the other position 
open and within one-half year of Waldron's termination, Waber 
recombined the two market segments under one title -- industrial 
market manager -- with Ed Brown in that position.  Waber responds 
(..continued) 
 However, we agree with the position advanced by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission as amicus curiae:  "where, as 
in Proud, the hirer and firer are the same and the discharge 
occurred soon after the plaintiff was hired, the defendant may of 
course argue to the factfinder that it should not find 
discrimination.  But this is simply evidence like any other and 
should not be accorded any presumptive value."  EEOC Br. 22.  
Additionally, as the EEOC further notes, it was plausible under 
the evidence presented at summary judgment that Waber would hire 
Waldron, use his skills for a few years while a younger person 
was being "groomed" for his position, then fire Waldron because 
of his age.  Id. at 22-23.  Thus, even if we were inclined to 
apply Proud in some circumstances, this case would be an 
inappropriate candidate for the presumption. 
  
that Waldron's "facts and surmises" simply show that the company 
ultimately decided to adopt a "different organizational structure 
which was less expensive than the one it planned to implement at 
the time it decided to let him go -- and, as a result of this 
further restructuring, Mr. Waldron's former title was ultimately 
given to Ed Brown -- a younger employee (albeit one with many 
more years of continuous service with Waber)."  Appellees' Br. 
27-28.  But Waber does not provide any evidence in support of its 
contention that subsequent to Waldron's discharge the company 
adopted a new plan of reorganization.  More significantly, 
however, Waber's response ignores the inference created by 
evidence demonstrating that Waber split Waldron's job, fired him, 
offered one-half of his former job to a younger person while the 
other half remained unadvertised, and then recombined the jobs 
and placed the younger employee in the recombined post.  Although 
Waber may be able to explain this behavior at trial, a reasonable 
jury certainly could conclude that these actions cast sufficient 
doubt on the company's contention that Waldron was discharged as 
part of a plan of reorganization.7 
 Waldron also notes with respect to the reorganization 
that Waber's business plan for fiscal year 1992, which was worked 
                     
7
.   Waber conceded at oral argument that there was "no dispute" 
that Waber "vacillated" in the course of eighteen months, 
asserting that it went back and forth five times in splitting and 
recombining the Industrial Market Manager position during the 
period leading up to and immediately following Waldron's 
termination.  The company also explained that Waldron himself was 
the beneficiary of many of the vacillations.  That would not 
excuse, however, the use of a putative reorganization as a ruse 
to shunt Waldron out the door. 
  
on by both Woznicki and Mazik and presented to Waber's parent 
company just one month prior to Waldron's termination, did not 
show the industrial market manager position being split up into 
segments.  App. 233-34 (Mazik deposition).  Waber responds that 
the fact that the recently adopted business plan had Waldron's 
name in the industrial market manager spot is consistent with its 
explanation that it decided not to keep Waldron on in the 
reorganization.  This shows, the company contends, that the 
decision to fire him did not come until his poor performance in 
preparing and rehearsing the fiscal 1992 business plan in July.  
Yet Waldron's evidence suggests that the company did not intend 
to have two positions -- or at least not for long.  The 
permissible inference is that the reorganization was not planned, 
but rather pretextual. 
 Additionally, Waldron contends that there is evidence 
upon which the jury could conclude that the reorganization that 
cost Waldron his job demonstrated age-related prejudice by Waber.  
Waldron notes that when his predecessor at the industrial market 
manager position, Scott Hammill (twelve years his junior), had 
difficulties, Waber had found him help by splitting his position 
and giving him one half of the industrial market.  By contrast, 
Waldron notes, when Waber determined to split up Waldron's job 
(the same post Hammill had held), Waldron was not offered either 
segment of the industrial market, but instead was terminated. 
 Surprisingly, Waber did not respond to this last 
argument in its briefing.  Perhaps by way of partial response, 
however, Waber asserts the uncontroversial proposition that 
  
"barring an attempt to conceal discrimination," a company "`has 
the right to make business judgments on employee status, 
particularly when the decision involves subjective factors . . . 
that the [c]ompany deems essential' to the position" in question.  
Appellees' Br. 28, quoting Healy v. New York Life Insurance Co., 
860 F.2d 1209, 1220 (3d Cir. 1988).  That argument begs the 
question, however, of whether the reorganization was an attempt 
to conceal discrimination. 
 Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable 
to Waldron and weighing the parties' arguments, we agree with 
Waldron that the evidence presented at summary judgment would 
permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Waber's reorganization 
was not the reason for Waldron's termination, but rather a 
pretext.  The vacillations at Waber over whether to have a single 
industrial market manager or separate electrical and electronics 
managers may have been innocent, but under the evidence presented 
at summary judgment, a jury could reasonably question whether the 
"reorganization" that ostensibly precipitated Waldron's 
termination was in fact just a way of removing Waldron replacing 
him in the industrial market manager position with the younger Ed 
Brown.  Additionally, Waldron's evidence concerning the business 
plan is not without force:  a jury could reasonably conclude that 
Waber's failure to account for a split in the industrial market 
manager position in its carefully orchestrated business plan 
demonstrates that the reorganization came about because of 
Waber's desire to terminate Waldron's employment, rather than as 
a factor innocently leading to that result.  Thus, there is 
  
sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably determine 
that Waber's justification for terminating Waldron because of a 
reorganization was implausible and inconsistent.  
 2. 
 We turn, therefore, to Waber's contention that its 
dissatisfaction with the way in which Waldron pursued key 
accounts during his tenure as industrial market manager was part 
of the reason why the company terminated Waldron in the 
reorganization.  According to Waber, it grew frustrated by 
Waldron's alleged unwillingness or inability to pursue key 
accounts through face-to-face meetings at the headquarters of 
such customers and potential customers.  Waldron, however, 
contends that he submitted substantial evidence at summary 
judgment upon which a jury could reasonably determine that 
Waber's justification was either a post hoc fabrication or actual 
evidence of discrimination.  Again, we agree. 
 Initially, Waldron disputes whether in fact he failed 
to visit key accounts.  The district court quoted from and relied 
upon the testimony of Mazik, in which he stated that Waldron 
"`couldn't or wouldn't visit major accounts in the electrical 
distribution market . . . .'"  Waldron, 849 F. Supp. at 1002 
(quoting Mazik Dep.).  Waldron testified, however, that he 
visited key accounts, and also testified that his requests for 
authorization to travel were sometimes rejected by Woznicki.  
App. 62-64, 66, 162 (visited accounts), 127, 153-57 (Woznicki 
rejected travel requests). 
  
 The district court did not address any of this 
testimony at summary judgment -- to the contrary, it stated that 
Waldron had "concede[d] that he disregarded the company policy of 
calling on key accounts . . . ."  Waldron, 849 F. Supp. at 1005.  
As support, the district court cited a portion of Waldron's 
deposition that, in our view, simply does not support the theory 
that Waldron "conceded" anything.  See id. (citing Waldron Dep. 
at 439); cf. App. at 158-59 (showing context of material quoted 
by district court), 162 (Waldron testifies that in year preceding 
termination he made between 12 and 14 key account visits to 
company headquarters in electrical market and between 4 and 5 in 
electronics market). 
 Nevertheless, this evidence is not ultimately probative 
of pretext.  Waber submitted testimony suggesting that the 
company was dissatisfied with Waldron's efforts at contacting key 
accounts in face-to-face meetings at their business locations.  
E.g., App. 207, 211, 239.  Thus, the fact that Waldron indeed 
made key account visits is not probative of whether Waber 
believed that he should be doing more in that effort.  See Billet 
v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 825 (3d Cir. 1991) (plaintiff's 
"view of his performance is not at issue; what matters is the 
perception of the decision maker").  Of course, to the extent 
that Waldron's testimony tended to show that his supervisor 
hampered his efforts to make more key account visits, that 
evidence could lead to an inference that Waber intentionally set 
goals that Waldron could not meet.  Yet Waldron's deposition 
testimony on this point was equivocal.  When pressed by opposing 
  
counsel, Waldron stated that he had "no idea" where he had wanted 
to go on the three or four occasions on which he sought but was 
refused authorization to travel.  App. 154.  Thus, crediting 
Waldron's evidence that he was denied such authorization, that 
still does not prove that the contemplated travel was for face-
to-face meetings with key accounts, as the company wanted. 
 Waldron's second thrust at the key account 
justification, however, is more powerful.  Waldron notes that 
despite Waber's contention that focusing on key accounts was an 
"edict of the company, especially under Ron Mazik's tenure, and 
even prior to that" (App. 208 (Woznicki Dep.)), or alternatively 
the "major focus, and that wasn't just for Reed Waldron" (App. 
212), Waber replaced Waldron with Ed Brown, an employee who had 
performed only as a "back-up" to sales representatives and who 
did not have any significant experience making calls to key 
accounts.  App. 191, 242-43.  Additionally, according to Mazik, 
Waber did not expect Brown to make key account calls after 
replacing Waldron -- Mazik stated that "[w]e didn't think that Ed 
Brown had the capabilities to do that."  App. 243.  And, 
according to Mazik, in fact "nobody" performed the job of calling 
on key accounts after Waldron's departure.  Id. 
 This evidence points in one of two probative 
directions.  On one hand, as Waldron argues, the evidence could 
lead a reasonable jury to reject Waber's explanation that the 
company fired Waldron because he failed to call sufficiently on 
key accounts.  Given the evidence that despite Waber's ostensible 
focus on key accounts, the company elevated (in an admittedly 
  
roundabout way, see supra pp. 12-14) to industrial market manager 
an employee with no sales experience (whom it considered 
incapable of calling on key accounts), and that no one called 
upon key accounts after Waldron was fired, a jury could 
reasonably conclude that visiting key accounts was not nearly as 
important to Waber as it said it was -- and that Waber's 
explanation for firing Waldron was thus unworthy of credence. 
 Alternatively, as Waldron also argues, one could view 
the evidence on key accounts as suggestive of a double standard.  
For Waldron, the evidence suggests, visiting key accounts was an 
element of the industrial market manager position.  For Brown, it 
was not. 
 Waber responds in two ways to Waldron's arguments.  
First, it asserts that the evidence, taken as true, would only 
support the inference that by the time Brown assumed the title of 
industrial market manager, that position had become a job lower 
on the organizational ladder with fewer responsibilities, and 
visiting key accounts was no longer among them.  Appellees' Br. 
30.  However, Waber provides no citation to the record to support 
the suggestion that Brown's job was lower on the organizational 
ladder, and we find both of the inferences suggested by Waldron 
-- that is, pretext or double standard -- to be at least equally 
as plausible as the one offered by Waber. 
 Second, Waber argues that Waldron's double-standard 
argument runs afoul of Fowle v. C & C Coal, a Div. of ITT-
Continental Baking Co., 868 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1989).  In Fowle, 
the plaintiff alleged that he had not been hired as a company 
  
vice president because of his age.  The company responded that 
Fowle did not satisfy one of the essential criteria of the job -- 
that is, he lacked the management skills necessary to possibly 
replace the president of the company within two to four years.  
Id. at 64.  Fowle attempted to show that this justification was 
pretextual by demonstrating that this ostensible prerequisite was 
subsequently relaxed (from two to four years to five to ten 
years) as soon as the company found a candidate younger than 
Fowle that it wanted to hire.  We rejected Fowle's argument, 
finding that Fowle's evidence suggested, at most, "an evolution 
of the position's specifications" over time.  Id. at 66.  Waber 
apparently believes that, in a similar manner, Waldron's evidence 
with respect to key account visits merely demonstrates that the 
industrial market manager position evolved over time, but creates 
no inference of pretext or discriminatory double standard. 
 Yet Fowle cannot be read so broadly.  If, every time 
one candidate for a position was rejected based on some criterion 
and another was ultimately hired notwithstanding his or her 
failure to satisfy the same criterion we nevertheless permitted 
employers to escape liability with the explanation that the job 
specifications had simply changed, we would rip a great hole in 
the Congressional scheme for affording relief for the victims of 
discrimination.  Indeed, Fowle itself makes this fact clear in a 
manner that distinguishes it from this case.  We noted that, even 
though the precise contours of the job requirement at issue there 
may have changed over time, there was "no evidence that potential 
to replace the President -- in whatever time frame -- was not a 
  
requirement" of the successful candidate.  Fowle, 868 F.2d at 66.  
By contrast, in the case before us, Waldron's evidence suggests 
that although visiting key accounts was a job requirement when he 
held the industrial market manager position, it promptly ceased 
to be one when he left.  Thus Fowle does not insulate Waber in 
this case. 
 The district court rejected Waldron's double-standard 
evidence based upon a different theory.  The district court found 
that whereas the typical double-standard case involves objective 
criteria, this case involved subjective criteria.  Waldron, 849 
F. Supp. at 1007.  Because the employment decision in this case 
involved subjective criteria, the district court reasoned, our 
decision in Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 
F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), prohibited the court -- or a jury -- 
from intruding into and second-guessing Waber's business 
decision. 
 We disagree with this analysis on several grounds.  
First, we disagree with the district court's apparent premise 
that visiting key accounts was a "subjective" job criterion.  The 
evidence at summary judgment indicated that it was an objective 
and readily assessable criterion.  Furthermore, Ezold does not 
stand for the proposition that it is always impermissible to 
review employers' subjective decision making -- indeed, quite to 
the contrary, Ezold contemplates that courts and juries must do 
so. 
 In Ezold, a female associate had been denied 
partnership at a law firm because the firm had decided that she 
  
was deficient in legal analysis skills.  She sued, alleging sex 
discrimination, and the district court agreed and found the firm 
liable.  We reversed.  We cautioned in the course of our opinion 
against "interfer[ing] in an otherwise valid management decision" 
without some evidence to "cast doubt" on the employer's proffered 
reasons.  Ezold, 983 F.2d at 527.  We focused, however, upon the 
district court's failure to stick to the criterion at issue in 
the employer's business justification.  We found that instead of 
determining whether the criterion of "legal analysis skills" had 
been applied in a discriminatory manner -- i.e., whether male 
associates had been welcomed into the partnership notwithstanding 
the firm's belief that they lacked legal analysis skills -- the 
district court had impermissibly determined that the plaintiff's 
other strengths outweighed any deficiencies in legal analysis.  
Id. at 527-28.  Thus, in disapproving the district court's 
analysis, we did not conclude that it would be impermissible for 
the district court to determine whether the criterion of "legal 
analysis skills" -- a standard with undeniably subjective 
elements -- had been applied differentially.  Rather, we stated: 
 Where an employer produces evidence that the 
plaintiff was not promoted because of its 
view that the plaintiff lacked a particular 
qualification the employer deemed essential 
to the position sought, a district court 
should focus on the qualification the 
employer found lacking in determining whether 
non-members of the protected class were 
treated more favorably. 
Ezold, 983 F.2d at 528.  Therefore, Ezold does not stand for the 
proposition that courts and juries are foreclosed from assessing 
  
whether an employer created a double standard using one or more 
subjective criteria, but instead stands for the opposite 
principle. 
 Thus, it is evident that Waldron also cast substantial 
doubt upon Waber's proffered justification that it decided to 
terminate Waldron because of his failure to visit key accounts 
with sufficient regularity.  Indeed, viewed in the light most 
favorable to him, Waldron's evidence suggests either that failure 
to visit key accounts with regularity was not really a reason for 
Waldron's termination (that is, the reason is pretextual) or that 
Ed Brown was treated more favorably than Waldron, suggesting not 
just pretext, but in fact discriminatory bias. 
 3. 
 As we have seen, Waber contended that economic hardship 
forced a restructuring of the industrial market manager position, 
and that the decision not to retain Waldron for either of the two 
positions was motivated largely by the fact that Waldron had 
failed to visit key accounts with sufficient regularity.  
Appellees' Br. 8-9.  The company contends, however, that the 
decision to terminate Waldron "became inescapable during June 
1991 as Waber was preparing to present its business plan" for 
fiscal year 1992.  Id. at 9.  Waber contends that Waldron showed 
his weaknesses as an employee at this point in three areas:  
(a) drafting his portion of the business plan in an inadequate 
manner that required substantial rewriting by his supervisors; 
(b) failing to perform adequately at a dress rehearsal of the 
presentation of the business plan to corporate officers of 
  
Waber's parent; and (c) making stray comments at the actual 
presentation of the business plan that suggested that Waldron was 
either unaware of or disagreed with the direction in which the 
company was headed. 
 Initially, we note that none of these factors was 
presented to the district court or argued to us as an independent 
justification for Waber's decision to terminate Waldron.  Rather, 
each was ostensibly a proverbial straw which, taken together, 
broke a back weakened by Waber's need to reorganize and Waldron's 
failure to serve key accounts in the manner desired by his 
superiors.  Having produced evidence upon which a jury could 
reasonably conclude that both the reorganization and key account 
justifications were pretextual (and in the latter case possibly 
evidence of bias), Waldron thus has also undermined the vitality 
of the other proffered justifications that we turn to now.  
However, since Waldron does not rest merely upon his refutation 
of Waber's principal business justifications for the termination 
of his employment, but rather provides particularized responses 
to these "final straw" justifications, we address his evidence 
and arguments below. 
   (a) 
 At summary judgment in the district court, Waber relied 
upon the deposition testimony of Woznicki to support its 
contention that Waber was discouraged by Waldron's draft of his 
portion of the business plan for fiscal year 1992, which required 
a "massive overhaul" by Woznicki and Mazik to get it in shape to 
present to Waber's parent company.  See Waldron, 849 F. Supp. at 
  
1002; see also App. 216.  This dissatisfaction, Waber contended, 
helped to tilt the balance against retaining Waldron. 
 Waldron responds that he presented evidence by way of 
his own testimony that no changes were made his portion of the 
business plan.  App. 173.  Waber criticizes Waldron's testimony 
as "self-serving," but the Supreme Court has made it clear that 
self-serving testimony may be utilized by a party at summary 
judgment.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 
(1986)(noting that plaintiff may create material issue of fact by 
proffering, inter alia, "her own affidavits").  Furthermore, it 
is obvious that the testimony is no more self-serving than 
Woznicki's was on behalf of Waber.  Waldron's testimony was under 
oath and subject to cross examination, just as was Woznicki's.  
Since no other evidence was presented aside from the two 
deponents' competing recollections, we see little reason to 
credit one and reject the other.  Instead, we see this as a 
disputed material fact issue to be resolved at trial. 
 Waber also states that the issue was not whether 
Waldron believed that he wrote his portion of the business plan 
adequately, but rather whether Woznicki and Mazik were satisfied 
with it.  Yet Waldron's testimony, if believed, establishes that 
Woznicki and Mazik did not rewrite the business plan, which casts 
serious doubt on Waber's contention that it was dissatisfied with 
Waldron's efforts. 
 (b) 
 With respect to the so-called "dress rehearsal" of 
Waber's fiscal 1992 business plan, Waldron concedes that he 
  
performed poorly -- "I . . . came off as being unprepared, which 
I was."  App. 175.  Waldron maintained at summary judgment, 
however, that evidence demonstrated that he was "tripped up" by 
Mazik and "singled out" at the meeting -- which he had not been 
told was a dress rehearsal -- as the only one forced to make his 
presentation.  App. 173-75.8  Again, Waber contends that this 
evidence was "self-serving" deposition testimony, but we see no 
reason for not finding that it, too, creates a disputed issue of 
material fact. 
 (c) 
 Finally, Waber, using the testimony of Woznicki, argued 
that Woznicki and Mazik also were dissatisfied with Waldron's 
performance at the actual presentation of the fiscal 1992 
business plan to Waber's parent company, SL Industries.  
Specifically, Woznicki stated that, after completing his 
presentation, Waldron mentioned that the way to expand Waber's 
business was "through [sales] rep[resentative] commission 
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.   At oral argument, Waldron made an additional argument not 
present in his briefs:  to the extent that the meeting at which 
he was forced to make his impromptu presentation was a dress 
rehearsal, a jury could reasonably infer that Waber's reaction to 
Waldron's mistakes were stereotypical.  That is, dress rehearsals 
are meant to shake out the bugs and allow people to make 
mistakes, but Waber reacted in a manner that suggested that it 
believed that when an older employee makes a mistake, he cannot 
learn.  Waldron's counsel might be able to make this argument to 
the jury, of course, but we refuse to rely upon it because it is 
premised on the theory that mistakes are expected at dress 
rehearsals and were tolerated when made by employees other than 
Waldron at the rehearsal in question, assuming that the meeting 
was in fact a dress rehearsal.  Based on the record before us, 
that is speculation, not evidence. 
  
increases."  App. 217 (Woznicki Dep.).  This comment, Woznicki 
stated, made him and Mazik look bad because that was not what the 
company planned to do.  Id.  The comment was especially damaging 
because this was Mazik's first presentation to Waber's parent 
company, and he had wanted everything to go flawlessly.  Id. 
 Waldron responded at summary judgment, however, by 
pointing to his deposition testimony, in which, apparently 
reading from the business plan itself, he noted that "[r]evamping 
[sales representatives'] commissions to reward growth" was in the 
plan.  App. 177.  Waldron also notes that in the same memorandum 
to industrial sales representatives in which Woznicki announced 
Waldron's termination, Woznicki also announced an increase in 
sales representatives' commissions as a promotional effort (App. 
192), suggesting that increasing commissions was not inconsistent 
with Waber's growth strategy.  This evidence could permit a jury 
to conclude that it was implausible that Woznicki and Mazik felt 
that Waldron's comments at the formal presentation concerning 
increased commissions showed that he was unaware of or in 
disagreement with the company's focus. 
 4. 
 Finally, we note Waldron's additional argument that he 
has evidence of age-related animus or bias in the form of a 
comment made to him by Mazik.  Waldron testified that five months 
prior to his termination, in a meeting in which Mazik promoted 
Waldron to industrial market manager, Mazik told him, "I want you 
to lose weight.  He told me that it'll make you feel better.  
It'll make you look younger."  App. 129.  The district court 
  
found that "Mazik's comment that plaintiff might consider losing 
weight in no way indicates that plaintiff's termination was 
motivated by age."  Waldron, 849 F. Supp. at 1008.  Noting that 
the comment was five-months prior to Waldron's termination and in 
the context of a promotion, and also Waldron's concession that 
Mazik did not condition continued employment upon satisfying 
Mazik's desires, the court concluded that "we believe the comment 
to be a stray remark entitled to little if any weight . . . ."  
Id., citing Ezold, 983 F.2d at 545. 
 We disagree.  Crediting the evidence, the comment was 
made by the person who, according to Waber itself (Appellees' Br. 
6), ultimately approved the decision to terminate Waldron.  
Furthermore, although the comment was made five months prior to 
Waldron's termination, it occurred at a time when, according to 
Mazik himself, Woznicki was already arguing to him that Waldron's 
employment should be terminated.  App. 236.9  Thus, we believe 
that the comment may be entitled to some weight when considered 
by the jury, although standing on its own it would likely be 
insufficient to demonstrate age-related animus.  In other words, 
the comment is not irrelevant, especially when coupled with 
Waldron's other evidence of discrimination, which demonstrates a 
double standard was applied vis-a-vis Brown as to visiting "key 
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.   Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 
(3d Cir. 1992), is distinguishable on both grounds mentioned in 
the text:  the discriminatory comment in that case was made by a 
non-decisionmaker, five years prior to the decision to refuse the 
plaintiff in that case admission into the law firm partnership.  
Ezold, 983 F.2d at 545. 
  
accounts."  A reasonable jury could conclude that this evidence 
of discrimination, coupled with Waldron's prima facie case, 
proved that age discrimination was more likely than not a 
determinative factor in Waber's decision to terminate Waldron's 
employment.  
 C. 
 To summarize, Waldron provided sufficient evidence upon 
which a reasonable jury could determine that Waber's proffered 
justifications for its decision to terminate Waldron's employment 
were unworthy of credence.  Waldron has cast doubt upon Waber's 
contention that the need for a business reorganization 
precipitated Waldron's firing, and he also has produced evidence 
upon which the jury could conclude that Waldron was not let go 
because of dissatisfaction about his alleged failure to visit key 
accounts with sufficient regularity.  Indeed, a jury could 
permissibly infer from Waldron's evidence concerning key accounts 
that Waber applied a double standard with respect to Waldron and 
the much younger Ed Brown.  By undercutting these principal 
justifications for terminating Waldron's employment, Waldron has 
also provided reasonable grounds upon which a jury could reject 
as weak and implausible Waber's three ostensible "final straws" 
-- Waldron's alleged poor draftsmanship on a portion of the 
business plan, his poor performance at a putative dress rehearsal 
of a presentation of that plan, and the dissonance ostensibly 
caused by Waldron's offhand comments after formal presentation of 
the plan.  Additionally, however, as we have just discussed, 
Waldron has produced particularized evidence upon which a jury 
  
could reasonably conclude that each of these ostensible last 
straws is unworthy of credence. 
 Furthermore, this record is not without evidence which 
tends to support not just pretext, but pretext for 
discrimination.  As we discussed at greater length above, a jury 
could reasonably infer that Waldron's evidence with respect to 
key accounts demonstrated that Waber imposed a double standard.  
Mazik's comment that he wanted Waldron to lose weight because it 
would make him look younger takes on a more suspicious cast when 
coupled with evidence that Woznicki was already pushing Mazik to 
fire Waldron when the comment was made.  If a jury then reflected 
that Waldron was not kept on when the industrial market manager 
position was split in two because he failed to visit key 
accounts, but that young Ed Brown was elevated ultimately to a 
reconstituted industrial market manager position without having 
to call upon key accounts, the jury might reasonably infer that 
Brown's youth excused his inability to service the key accounts.  
Thus, even if we were permitted to ignore Fuentes and its progeny 
and apply a "pretext-plus" standard, we nevertheless would 
conclude that Waldron satisfied that standard, as well. 
 Because Waldron produced sufficient evidence to survive 
summary judgment on his ADEA claim, we will reverse the district 
court's judgment in favor of Waber on that claim. 
 III. 
 The district court granted summary judgment not only on 
Waldron's ADEA claim, however, but also on his claim under the 
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, reasoning that the LAD and 
  
ADEA "are governed by the same standards and burden of proof 
structures applicable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq."  Waldron, 849 F. Supp. at 1000, 
citing Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 569 A.2d 
793 (1990), and Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 538 
A.2d 794 (1988).  Thus, we must assess whether summary judgment 
in the LAD claim must be reversed as well. 
 Since the district court's opinion in this case, we 
have predicted in McKenna v. Pacific Rail Services, Inc., 32 F.3d 
820 (3d Cir. 1994), that the New Jersey Supreme Court would adopt 
Hicks's "clarification of the test to be applied in federal 
discrimination cases in interpreting the LAD . . . ."  Id. at 
824.  This is consistent with the district court's hypothesis 
about the similarities between federal and New Jersey law 
relating to age discrimination.  McKenna, however, involved a 
jury trial under the LAD, and we reversed because the district 
court had not provided jury instructions consonant with Hicks.  
It did not involve the standard for summary judgment under the 
LAD, and the parties here did not brief the issue of whether the 
New Jersey Supreme Court would adopt Fuentes, just as we 
predicted in McKenna that it would adopt Hicks. 
 Largely for reasons discussed in McKenna, we believe 
that the New Jersey Supreme Court would adopt our reasoning in 
Fuentes as governing what evidence must be produced by a 
plaintiff to survive summary judgment in an indirect evidence 
case after Hicks.  As we noted in McKenna, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has not only adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework for 
  
evaluating discrimination cases based upon indirect evidence, but 
has consistently looked to federal courts for guidance about the 
application of the shifting-burdens analysis.  McKenna, 32 F.3d 
at 827.  Where the New Jersey Supreme Court has departed from 
federal precedent, it has often done so in order to lessen the 
burdens on plaintiffs.  Id. at 827-28.  And indeed, consistent 
with Fuentes, we stated in McKenna that a plaintiff's proof of a 
prima facie case and rebuttal of an employer's justifications 
"may suffice [to carry a plaintiff's ultimate burden of 
persuasion] if the factfinder believes that the employer offered 
false reasons to conceal unlawful discrimination. . . ."  Id. at 
831.10  These considerations lead us to conclude that the New 
Jersey Supreme Court would adopt the more liberal "pretext-only" 
standard enunciated in Fuentes for determining a plaintiff's 
burden at summary judgment, rather than the more demanding 
"pretext-plus" standard adopted by some of our sister circuits. 
 Thus, what we said about Waldron's ADEA claims also 
applies here, and for the reasons provided in Section II, supra, 
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.   Of course, in McKenna we predicted that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would adopt Hicks, instead of some more lenient 
rule, because of the following:  (1) in New Jersey, as in federal 
law, plaintiffs always retain the ultimate burden of persuasion 
with respect to claims of discrimination (McKenna v. Pacific Rail 
Service, 32 F.3d 820, 828 (3d Cir. 1994)); (2) New Jersey and 
federal rules relating to presumptions are similar (id. at 
829-30); and (3) the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in 
Goodman v. London Metals Exch., Inc., 86 N.J. 19, 429 A.2d 341 
(1981), was consistent with the Hicks formulation of a 
plaintiff's burden at trial (McKenna, 32 F.3d at 830-31).  Those 
factors in no way suggest that the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
refuse to adopt Fuentes. 
  
we find that Waldron's LAD claims should have survived summary 
judgment, as well. 
 IV. 
 In conclusion, we find that Waldron proffered 
sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on his ADEA 
claims under Fuentes.  We also predict that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would adopt Fuentes as a proper articulation of a 
plaintiff's burden at summary judgment for claims under the LAD.  
Thus, we will reverse the district court's judgment in its  
  
entirety and remand this case for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
